This paper deals with the inference problem of data cube queries in on-line analytical processing (OLAP) systems. Even though OLAP systems restrict user accesses to predefined aggregations, the possibility of inappropriate disclosure of sensitive attribute values still exists. Based on a definition of non-compromiseability to mean that any member of a set of variables satisfying a given set of their aggregates can have more than one value, we derive sufficient conditions for non-compromiseability in sum-only data cubes. Specifically, (1) the non-compromiseability of multi-dimensional aggregates can be reduced to that of one dimensional aggregates, (2) full or dense core cuboids are non-compromiseable, and (3) there is a tight lower bound for the cardinality of a core cuboid to remain non-compromiseable. Based on those conditions, and a three-tiered model for controlling inferences, we provide a divide-andconquer algorithm that uniformly divides data sets into blocks and builds a data cube on each such block. The collection of those data cubes are then used to provide users with inference-free OLAP queries.
Introduction
Decision support systems such as On-line Analytical Processing (OLAP) are becoming increasingly important in industry. OLAP systems are designed to assist users in exploring trends and patterns in large amount of data by providing them with interactive results of statistical aggregations. Contrary to this initial objective, inappropriate disclosure of sensitive data stored in those systems results in the breach of individual's privacy and jeopardizes organization's interest. It is well known that access control alone is insufficient in controlling information disclosure, because information not released directly may be inferred indirectly by manipulating legitimate queries about aggregated information, which is known as the inference control problem in databases. OLAP systems are vulnerable to such unwanted inferences. Providing inference-free answers to data cube style OLAP queries while not adversely impacting the performance in an OLAP system is the subject matter of this paper.
The inference problem has been investigated since 70's with many inference control methods proposed especially for statistical databases. However, most of those methods become computationally infeasible if £ This work was partially supported by the National Science Foundation under grant CCR-0113515. directly applied to OLAP systems. Most OLAP applications demand instant response to interactive queries, although those queries usually aggregate a large amount of data [22, 17] . Most existing inference control algorithms have run times proportional to the size of the queries or data set. Furthermore, those algorithms are enforced only after queries are submitted by users, which makes it difficult to shift their computational complexity to off-line processing. The performance penalty renders them impractical for OLAP systems.
Unlike in statistical databases where queries are usually arbitrary, in OLAP systems queries usually comprise of well-structured operations such as group-by, cross-tab and sub-totals. Those operations are generalized by the data cube operator [21] . Traditional inference control mechanisms are computationally infeasible for OLAP systems partially because they ignore the unique structures of OLAP queries. As we shall show in this paper, efficient inference control is possible for data cube queries in OLAP systems. Table 1 shows a data cube about employee salaries. The data cube is represented by a collection of twodimensional cross tabulations [21] . Each cross tabulation corresponds to a quarter of the year. The two dimensions are month and employee. Each internal cell of a cross tabulation contains the monthly salary value for an employee. We assume that individual salary values are sensitive and should be hidden from users, and therefore have been replaced with "?". An internal cell containing the symbol N/a indicates that the employee does not possess a valid salary in the month. Each external cell of a cross tabulation contains either the subtotal salary of the four employees in a month, or the subtotal salary of an employee in a quarter.
Quarter Month / Employee Alice Bob
Jim Mary Sub Total , equal to the subtotal in September, because she is the only employee who draws a salary in the month.
3. For the fourth quarter, no hidden value can be derived in the similar way as Mary's September salary is in the third quarter. This is so because all subtotals in the fourth quarter are calculated from at least two hidden values. However, the following inference is possible. As shown in Table 3 Sub Total 7000 4300 3000 7000 Table 3 : Example of a Data Cube with Inference
The salaries and subtotals in above example can be generalized as a set of unknown variables and a given set of their aggregates, respectively. Based on a definition of non-compromiseability to mean that any member of a set of unknown variables satisfying a given set of their aggregates can have more than one value 1 , we derive sufficient conditions for non-compromiseability in sum-only data cubes: (1) the noncompromiseability of multi-dimensional aggregates can be reduced to that of one dimensional aggregates, (2) full or dense core cuboids are non-compromiseable, and (3) there is a tight lower bound for the cardinality of a core cuboid to remain non-compromiseable. Based on our results, and a three-tier model for controlling inferences, we provide a divide-and-conquer algorithm that uniformly divides data sets into blocks and builds a data cube on each such block. The union of those data cubes are then used to provide users with inference-free OLAP queries. In this paper we elaborate and justify the preliminary results given in [33] , and address various implementation issues and improvements to the algorithm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing inference control methods proposed in statistical databases and OLAP systems. Section 3 formalizes sum-only data cubes and the compromiseability. Section 4 proves cardinality-based sufficient conditions for non-compromiseability in sum-only data cubes. Section 5 proposes a three tier inference control model to reduce performance penalty caused by inference control mechanisms. Section 6 integrates the sufficient conditions of non-compromiseability into an inference control algorithm on the basis of the three-tier model. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Related Work
Inference control has been extensively studied in statistical databases as surveyed in [15, 1, 16] . Inference control methods proposed in statistical databases are usually classified into two main categories; restriction based techniques and perturbation based techniques. Restriction based techniques [20] include restricting the size of a query set (i.e., the entities that satisfy a single query), overlap control [18] in query sets, auditing all queries in order to determine when inferences are possible [12, 9, 24, 27, 6] , suppressing sensitive data in released statistical tables [13] , partitioning data into mutually exclusive partitions [10, 11] while restricting each query set to range over at most one partition. Perturbation based technique includes adding noise to source data [32] , outputs [5, 28] , database structure [30] , or size of query sets (by sampling data to answer queries) [14] . Some variations of the inference problem have been studied lately, such as the inference caused by arithmetic constraints [8, 7] , inferring approximate values instead of exact values [27] and inferring intervals enclosing exact values [25] .
The inference control methods proposed for statistical databases generally sacrifice efficiency for the ability of controlling the inference caused by arbitrary queries. However, this is usually not desirable in OLAP systems where near real time response takes priority over the generality of answerable queries. Hence most of the methods suitable for statistical databases are computationally infeasible in OLAP systems. As an example, Audit Expert [12] models inference problem with a linear system of equations . This is prohibitive for data warehouses and OLAP systems, because ¢ and £ can be as large as a million in those systems.
Our work shares with [18] the similar motivation of controlling inference with cardinalities of data and queries. Dobkin et al. give an lower bound on the number of arbitrary sum queries that compromise sensitive values [18] . Under the assumptions that each query sums exactly s um queries are required to compromise any sensitive value. Although this result applies to OLAP queries, it does not take into account the special structures of those queries. In this paper we attempt to derive better results specially for data cube style OLAP queries.
To the best of our knowledge, inference control for OLAP systems and data warehouses are limited to [3, 2, 19, 29] . They all attempt to perturb sensitive values while preserving the data distribution model. Hence the classification or association rules obtained before or after the perturbation remains the same. Those works are application-specific. The sole purpose of data analysis is limited to classification (association rule mining). However, we do not have this restriction and we do not use perturbation based methods in this paper.
In [33] we present our preliminary results including the definition of data cubes and its compromiseability, and the cardinality-based non-compromiseability criteria. However, the detailed justification and implementation consideration are absent in [33] due to space limitation. We shall address those issues in this paper.
Definition of Data Cubes and Compromiseability
This section defines the basic concepts and notations we shall use in the following discussions. First in Section 3.1 we model data cubes and their components. Next in Section 3.2 we define aggregation matrix and compromiseability. Finally in Section 3.3 we explain the choices made in our design.
Data Cube
Definition 1 (Core Cuboids) 
Given
, is defined as:
. The aggregation set of a set of aggregation vectors % #
, denoted as 
Definition 2 introduces *-value, *-element, augmented dimension, aggregation cuboid, aggregation vector, aggregation set and data cube. The *-value, denoted by "*", is a special value that is unequal to any positive integer. The *-elements are the elements of a vector that have *-values. The augmented dimension of any dimension according to Definition 1 is the union of the dimension and 
) § §
, there exist totally¨¤ © j-* aggregation cuboids. Each vector in a j-* aggregation cuboid is called a j-* aggregation vector. Given any j-* aggregation cuboid, a tuple in the core cuboid is in the aggregation set of an aggregation vector, if the tuple matches the aggregation vector in all elements except the *-elements. Any tuple may be in the aggregation set of many aggregation vectors, and similarly any aggregation set may contain more than one tuple. Hence aggregation set is a many to many relation between the core cuboid and j-* aggregation cuboid. Any tuple must be in the aggregation set of at least one aggregation vector, but an aggregation set may be empty. A data cube is the pair of a core cuboid and the collection of all the aggregation cuboids with the same § dimensions. We notice that aggregation cuboids are solely decided by their § dimensions, but the core cuboid also depends on the tuples missing from it. Table 5 illustrates concepts defined in Definition 2, following the example in Table 4 . First we obtain two identical augmented dimensions as
. As shown in the left cross tabulation in Table 5 , the Cartesian product of the two augmented dimensions gives 25 vectors. Among them we have two 1-* aggregation cuboids as
, and one 2-* aggregation cuboids
. The right cross tabulation in Table 5 shows a 2-dimensional data cube
is the same core cuboid as in Table 4 , and ¢ includes three aggregation cuboids. Notice that the two augmented dimensions are shown only for the purpose of clarity, and they are not a part of the data cube. The tuples composing the aggregation set of the aggregation vector 
Compromiseability
We use the following conventions in our further discussions of sets of vectors. Whenever applicable, we assume the members of a set are sorted according to the orders stated below:
1. Tuples in a core cuboid (or its subset) and aggregation vectors in an aggregation cuboid (or its subset) are in dictionary order ( by saying so, we are treating vectors as strings with the leftmost element the most significant ). For example, the core cuboid ! " # $
in Table 4 is sorted as
Aggregation cuboids in
¢ or its subsets are sorted first in ascending order according to the number of *-elements in their aggregation vectors, and then in descending order on the index of the *-elements. For example, ¢ shown in Table 5 is sorted as 
. The aggregation matrix is unique for any given core cuboid and set of aggregation vectors due to the convention of ordering stated in Section 3.2. The aggregation matrix is an abstraction of the relation between tuples and aggregation vectors defined by aggregation set. Our definition of compromiseability is based on the definition of aggregation matrix. Table 6 illustrates the concept of aggregation matrix. The cross tabulation shows the same data cube as in Table 5 , but the tuples and 1-* aggregation vectors are indexed with subscripts according to our order convention. For clarity purpose, normal font are used for the indexes of tuples while italic font for those of 
Definition 4 formalizes compromiseability. In any given data cube, the core cuboid is compromiseable by a set of aggregation vectors if at least one unit row vector is in the reduced row echelon form (RREF) of the aggregation matrix. As stated above, the aggregation matrix for any given set of aggregation vectors is unique. Moreover, by linear algebra [23] the RREF (Reduced Row Echelon Form) of any matrix is also unique and can be obtained through a finite number of elementary row operations. Hence compromiseability is decidable for any given set of aggregation vectors. Trivial compromiseability occurs when at least one unit row vector is in the aggregation matrix itself. Non-trivial compromiseabilty occurs when no unit row vector exists in the aggregation matrix, but at least one exists in its RREF. We say that the § ¨ © tuple is compromised if the § ¨ © unit row vector (the unit row vector whose § ¨ © element is 1) is in the RREF of the aggregation matrix. Table 7 gives an example of compromiseability. The matrix in Table 7 is the RREF of the aggregation matrix ¡ in Table 6 . The first row of ¡ is a unit row vector. Hence in Table 6 , the set of 1-* aggregation cuboids Table 6 3
.3 Formalization Rationale
It is a common approach in the literature to model dimensions using integer intervals. The actual values of different data types in the domain of a dimension is related to a set of integers by a one-to-one mapping. For example, dimensions month and employee in Table 3 are mapped to integer intervals § ¢ in Table 4 . Such an abstraction ignores the specific values in each dimension and focuses on the structure of the data cube. Although dimensions may have continuous domains and infinitely many values, such as salaries, any given instance of data cube must contain only finite number of values. As stated in Definition 1, we map a value to an integer only if it appears in one or more tuples in the core cuboid. Hence it is sufficient to use an arbitrary large but fixed integer interval for each dimension, as in Definition 1. Notice that some inference problems depend on the specific values in each tuple, such as those discussed in [26, 27, 25] . We do not address those problems in this paper.
The core cuoid, aggregation cuboids, and data cube in Definition 1 are similar to those in [21] . For example, the real-world data cube in Table 3 is modeled in Table 4 . However, unlike in [21] , we model data cubes using sets of vectors instead of defining them as a relational operator. In doing so we are able to conveniently refer to any specific tuple or aggregation without complex relational queries. Our work in Section 4 depends on this choice. We define the concepts of core cuboid and aggregation cuboids separately, while they are not explicitly distinguished in [21] . The reason for our choice is that only tuples in core cuboid are assumed to contain sensitive values, but aggregations are not. This may not be valid for some special applications, where some users are prohibited from accessing certain aggregated values. Our ongoing work address this issue.
Missing tuples and full core cuboid formalized in Definition 1 reflect the sparsity of real-world data cubes. That is, not all combinations of dimension values are populated by data tuples. The set of missing tuples is the complement of the core cuboid with respect to the full core cuboid. We assume that users possess the external knowledge ( the knowledge obtained through means other than queries [12] ) about missing tuples. This assumption holds if users are allowed to access the dimension values of each tuple. For example, months and employees in Table 3 . When all dimension values are hidden from users, the information of missing tuples can still be obtained through queries containing counts. For inference purpose, it is equivalent for users to know that a tuple is missing, or to know the tuple contains a zero value. Thus missing tuple is actually a special case of the external knowledge about a sensitive data value. Consequently, our definition of missing tuples models not only the actual missing tuples in real-world data cubes, but also the more general external knowledge about sensitive values. For example, Table 8 shows two variations of the data cube shown in Table 3 . The upper cross tabulation assumes that users know employee Mary to have a zero (but valid) salary for October. The lower cross tabulation assumes that users know Mary to have a salary of § ¨ ¨ ¨
. For those two varied data cubes, our model remains the same as in Table 4 .
Our definition of aggregation matrix and compromiseability is similar to those used by Chin in [12] . In [12] , Chin first treats a set of sum queries on sensitive values as a linear system of equations. It then follows from linear algebra that determining compromiseability of the sensitive values is equivalent to determining the existence of unit row vectors in the RREF of the coefficient matrix of the linear system. In our study, we directly define compromiseability based on the RREF of the aggregation matrix. For example, in the cross tabulation shown in Table 9 we represent salaries as unknown variables ¡ to ¥ , and then obtain the linear system shown in Table 9 . The coefficient matrix of the linear system is identical to the aggregation matrix shown in Table 6 .
Cardinality-based Non-compromiseability Criteria
In this section we prove cardinality-based non-compromiseability criteria for data cubes. Our results relate the cardinality of core cuboids to the compromiseability of data cubes. We separately discuss the trivial compromiseability case in Section 4.1 and the non-trivial compromiseability case in Section 4.2. As stated in Section 3, the difference between the two cases is whether or not the aggregation matrix contains unit row Table 3 vectors.
Trivial Compromiseability
We have two results for the trivial compromiseability. The first is that full core cuboids cannot be trivially compromised. The second gives an upper bound on the cardinality of a core cuboid such that the core cuboid is trivially compromised by the set of all 1-* aggregation cuboids. These results are stated and proved in Theorem 1. 
Theorem 1 In a given
§ dimensional data cube ) ! " # $ ¢ ¢ with § dimensions ¡ ¢ £ ¢ £ £ £ ¢ ¤ ,¢ ¡ if ! " # $ ) ¤ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¢ ¥ ¡ ¡ ¢ ¡ £ ¢ £ £ £ ¢ ¡ ¤ ¦ .
Proof:
1. By Definition 4 we need to show that for any , we have ! " ¥ ¦ §
. Without loss of generality, let be the j-* aggregation vector
. By Definition 2, we have Table 9 : Equations Formulating the Disclosure of the Core Cuboid Given in Table 3 2. Suppose ! " # $
is not trivially compromised. We show that 
This proves the inductive case of our induction, from which the claim 0
¢ Theorem 1 provides cardinality-based criteria to determine the trivial compromiseability of data cubes. The first claim of Theorem 1 considers a full core cuboid and the second considers a core cuboid so sparse that its cardinality is under the upper bound given by the theorem. Intuitively, a full core cuboid has no missing tuple. The aggregation set of any 1-* aggregation vector has a cardinality equal to the size of the dimension having *-value. Moreover, the aggregation set of any aggregation vector with more than one *-elements has a cardinality no less than some 1-* aggregation vectors. Hence any aggregation set contains more than one tuple. For example, in Table 5 , the aggregation set of all the 1-* aggregation vectors contain at least two tuples, and the only 2-* aggregation vector contains all the nine tuples in the core cuboid. On the other hand, a core cuboid containing fewer tuples than the upper bound given by Theorem 1 is always trivially compromised. This is so because not enough tuples exist in the core cuboid in order for all the aggregation sets to contain more than one tuple. Notice if the core cuboid contains no tuple at all, then no aggregation set contains one tuple. However, this extreme case does not conform to Definition 1, because we require all dimension values to be present in at least one tuple.
For data cubes with cardinalities between the two limits stated in Theorem 1, the trivial compromiseability cannot be determined solely by the cardinality of core cuboids. Two data cubes whose core cuboids have the same cardinality but different distribution of missing tuples can have different trivial compromiseability. For example, the core cuboid ! " # $ in Table 5 is not trivially compromised. Without changing the cardinality of ! " # $ 
Non-trivial Compromiseability
In this section, we derive cardinality-based criteria to determine the non-trivial compromiseability of data cubes. We have two results. The first says that full core cuboids cannot be non-trivially compromised. The second gives a tight lower bound on the cardinality of core cuboids for their non-trivial compromiseability. First we have Lemma 1, which will be used in proving further results.
Lemma 1
1. In any given data cube . Let be the set of 1-* aggregation vectors defined as:
. We have that , the data cube shown in Table 5 validates the base case of our inductive hypothesis. We briefly describe how to extend this result for § to § . We do so by regarding part of the § dimensional data cube as a special two dimensional data cube. Specifically, given § dimensional data cube
and be the collection of all 1-* aggregation vectors satisfying
. Hence ¡ can be represented as: 
¢
As the proof shows, the first claim of Lemma 1 holds because any aggregation matrix of a single aggregation cuboid contains only unit column vectors. This implies all the row vectors in the matrix are orthogonal and linearly independent. For example, the first four rows of the matrix shown in Table 6 comprises the aggregation matrix of a single aggregation cuboid and satisfies the stated properties. The second claim of Lemma 1 holds because for any aggregation vector containing more than one *-value, a set of 1-* aggregation vectors exists such that they have the same aggregation set. For example, in Table 5 Table 6 . We call the columns of containing the Table 6 With 0-Elements Omitted 
, that is, the second slice of contains no zero column. We then derive a contradiction to our assumptions.
and derive a contradiction to our assumptions.
Row vector¨
¥ satisfies the following condition: 
. Suppose all the assumptions hold and 0 is a function of the two least dimension cardinalities. Intuitively, the justification of the lower bound is based on the following fact. The least number of missing tuples necessary for any non-trivial compromise increases monotonically with the number of aggregation cuboids involved in the compromise. This number reaches its lower bound when exactly two aggregation cuboids are used for non-trivial compromises. This is exactly the case given by the second claim of Theorem 2. The second claim shows that it is impossible to derive non-trivial compromiseability criteria solely based on the cardinality of core cuboids, when the cardinality is not greater than the given lower bound. Thus the lower bound given by the third claim is the best possible. Table 1 is non-compromiseable. This is so because the core cuboid, as shown in Table 11 , contains three full slices on any of the two dimensions. Hence it cannot be non-trivially compromised. Moreover, its trivial non-compromiseability is straightforward. 
Corollary 1 (Non-trivial Compromiseability With Full Slices) In any data cube
) ! " # $ ¢ ¢ with dimensions ¡ ¢ £ ¢ £ £ £ ¢ ¤ : 1.) ¥ such that 0 ¥ ¥ ¢ ) ¦ ( 0 ¥ ¥ ! " # $ ¢ ) ¦ ¨ , then ! " # $ cannot
Three-Tier Inference Control Model
Traditional view of inference control has two tiers, that is, the data set and the answerable queries. The data set is usually modeled as a set of tuples, similar to the core cuboid defined in Section 3. A query selects a subset of tuples in the data set, called the query set of the query. The query then aggregates (for example, sums) the values of those tuples in the query set. Inference becomes a concern when the values being aggregated by the query are sensitive. With this two tier view, a typical restriction-based inference control mechanism checks a given set of queries for unwanted inferences and answers only those queries that do not compromise the sensitive values.
Inference control based on the two tier view has some inherent drawbacks. First of all, allowing arbitrary queries unnecessarily complicates inference control. Because any subset of a given data set may potentially be the query set of a query, a total of Inference control mechanisms developed under the two tier view usually have high on-line computational complexity. Here on-line computations refer to the computations conducted after queries have been posed to the system, and conversely off-line computations occur before queries are posed. In the two tier view of inference control, it is difficult for restriction-based inference control mechanisms to predict how incoming queries will aggregate data. Hence the major part of computational effort required by inference control mechanisms cannot be started until queries are received. Consequently, the time used by inference control adds to the system response time. This is unacceptable considering the high complexity of most inference control mechanisms.
Finally, rich dimension hierarchies embedded in most multi-dimensional data sets are ignored by the two tier view of inference control. That prevents inference control mechanisms from benefiting from those hierarchies. In Table 1 , the dimension hierarchy composing of month, quarter and year naturally divides the data set into four blocks, shown as the four cross-tabulations. In OLAP systems, most meaningful queries are formed on the basis of those partitions. As an example, a query that sums Alice's salary in January and Bob's salary in August conveys little useful information to users. Without taking dimension hierarchies into account, inference control mechanisms have to take the whole data set as their input, even when queries involve only a block of the data set.
To address the listed issues, we propose a three-tier inference control model consisting of three tiers with three relations in between, as shown in Figure 1 . The data tier is a set of tuples. Both aggregation tier and query tier are sets of queries. We do not consider the details of tuples and queries here, but instead we consider them as elements of sets. The relation ¡ ¢ is defined as the composition of ¡ £ and £ ¢ . We assume that a suitable definition of compromiseability has been given. In addition we enforce three properties on the model as the follows. In contrast to traditional two tier view of inference control, the three-tier model improves the performance of inference control mechanisms in several ways. Firstly, the size of the input to inference control mechanisms is dramatically reduced. Different from the two tier view, the three-tier view makes aggregation tier the input of inference control mechanisms. The third property of the three-tier model requires an aggregation tier to have a size comparable to that of the data tier . Choosing such an aggregation tier is possible, because as we have explained, the number of non-redundant aggregations is bounded by the size of the data tier . Secondly, the three-tier model facilitates using a divide-and-conquer approach to further reduce the size of inputs to inference control mechanisms by localizing the inference control problem. . Because most OLAP systems utilize pre-computed aggregations for query-answering, this query decomposition mechanism is in place or can be implemented easily. Hence by decoupling off-line and on-line processing of inference control and pushing computational complexity to the off-line part, the three-tier model can eliminate or reduce the delay of query-answering caused by inference control. may reduce the total number of answerable queries. This restriction reflects the unavoidable trade-off between availability and security. However, the design of aggregation tier should enable it to convey as much useful information as possible, while not endangering the sensitive information stored in the data tier . The usefulness of queries usually depends on application settings. For example, in OLAP applications data cube style aggregations, as modeled in Section 3, are the most popular queries users may pose to the system.
Cardinality-based Inference Control for Data Cubes
In this section we describe an inference control algorithm that integrates the cardinality-based compromiseability criteria developed in Section 4. We then show its correctness and computational complexity. Finally we discuss implementation issues and improvements to the algorithm.
Inference Control Algorithm
Our inference control algorithm is based on the three-tier inference control model discussed in Section 5. According to the model, inference control resides between the data tier and aggregation tier. Hence we shall focus on those two tiers. We address the query tier in Section 6.3. 
(from now on we use symbols with superscrits for sub-data cubes and their components).
¢ £
is the collection of 1-* aggregation vectors with non-empty aggregation sets in all the safe sub-data cubes. Notice that when integrating the aggregation vectors defined in sub-data cubes into ¢ £ , the aggregation set of each aggregation vector remains the same as it is originally defined in the sub-data cube. For example, the data cube in Table 1 
, in order to determine its non-compromiseability. The 1-* aggregation vectors with non-empty aggregation sets in those non-compromiseable sub-data cubes are returned to the main routine, and collectively constitute the aggregation tier.
Correctness and Time Complexity
Now we prove the correctness of algorithm Ctrl Inf Cube. More specifically, we show that the aggregation tier constructed by the algorithm satisfies the first and second properties of the model discussed in Section 5. 
. Because as stated earlier, in the data cube
remains the same as it is defined in , and the maximum subset of noncompromiseable aggregation vectors cannot be found in polynomial time [12] . Moreover, the complexity of our algorithm is handled by off-line processing, according to the three-tier inference control model.
Implementation Issues

Answering Queries
One issue yet to be addressed in implementing the three-tier inference control model shown in Figure 1 is to define the query tier. That is, how to answer user queries with the pre-computed aggregations. Such an issue has been studied in the caching schemes of OLAP applications [17] . Those schemes answer OLAP queries by first splitting them into sub-queries, and then use cached aggregates to calculate the results to those sub-queries. Although motivated by different objectives, our algorithm adopts a similar divide and conquer approach. We also partition the data tier into blocks, and pre-compute aggregations in each such block. Hence it is a natural choice to integrate our algorithm with the query answering mechanisms that already exist in OLAP applications.
However, inference control requires modifications to existing query-answering mechanisms. Typical OLAP queries select a subset of data from the data set and calculate aggregations in this subset. The data selected by those OLAP queries correspond to a multi-dimensional region of the data set. This region is split into blocks by query-answering mechanisms. For some queries, splitting the multi-dimensional region may result in boundary blocks, which only partially overlap the boundaries of the region. For caching schemes, those boundary blocks can be easily handled by calculating them directly from the data set. This simple approach does not apply in inference control. Boundary blocks are only partially selected by queries, thereby some of the aggregations required to answer the queries may not be in the aggregation tier, and are not guaranteed to be non-compromiseable. Various approaches can be adopted in dealing with boundary blocks depending on the requirements of applications. For instance, any aggregations in boundary blocks that are not in aggregation tier can simply be denied, or else an approximate answer may be given using aggregations in the aggregation tier. This restriction in answering queries is necessary for inference control purpose. Its impact on the precision of query results is usually acceptable, because a typical OLAP query selects a relatively large number of blocks, of which boundary blocks are only a small portion. Moreover, because we partition a data set on the basis of its dimension hierarchies, most meaningful queries will select a multi-dimensional region consisting of no boundary block.
For example, consider the data set shown in Table 1 , suppose that a query asks for the total salary of each employee in the the first two quarters. This query can be split into two sub-queries. The first sub-query asks for the subtotals in the first quarter, and similarly the second asks for the second quarter. The two sub-queries are safe to answer, because the two quarters are non-compromiseable and all the required subtotals are in the aggregation tier. Next, suppose another query asks for the total salary of each employee in the first four months. Splitting this query will make the second quarter a boundary block, because only the data of April is selected by the query. Answering this query will disclose all individual salaries in April if the subtotals in the first quarter are previously answered or derived. The query is safe as long as the user has not and will not be given those subtotals in the first quarter. However, it is impractical to make such an assumption, because it requires the entire history of queries asked by a specific user to be available and different users not to collude in deriving sensitive values.
Partitioning the Data Tier and the Aggregation Tier
The partitions on the data tier and the aggregation tier plays an important role in three-tier inference control. Partitioning should be based on dimension hierarchies of the data set, so that most useful queries can be split without having to deal with boundary blocks. Moreover, appropriate choice of dimension granularity of the partitioning is critical. Most practical data sets have deep dimension hierarchies composing of many dimensions of different granularities, with the coarser ones at the top of the hierarchy and finer ones at the bottom. Choosing coarser dimensions as the basis for partitioning leads to fewer and larger blocks, while choosing finer dimensions gives the converse. Larger blocks may cause more boundary blocks and less answerable queries. In the example discussed in Section 6.3.1, boundary blocks occur when splitting the query that sums the salaries in the first four months for each employee. The reason is that the dimension used to select data (month) is finer than the dimension used to partition the data set (quarter). In this example, no query would cause a boundary block if blocks are formed by months. However, blocks formed by months include sensitive aggregations, contradicting the last property of the three-tier model that the aggregation tier does not compromise the data tier. Moreover, smaller blocks may cause higher performance overhead. This is because with smaller blocks the same query needs to be split into more sub-queries. In an extreme situation, we can regard the traditional two-tier inference control as a special case of the three-tier model, in which every tuple constitutes its own block.
Because of the subtleties involved in choosing dimension granularities for partitions, it may sound promising to dynamically partition the data set tier. For example, begin with partitions defined on coarse dimensions, and then move to partitions defined on finer dimensions when incoming queries demand so. However, in this case the coexistence of different partitions makes inference control less feasible. One of the key performance benefits of the three-tier inference control is that most computational complexity is handled by off-line processing. This is possible only with statically partitioned data tier. Varying partitions at run-time loses this benefit because it requires more run-time activities.
Re-ordering Tuples in Unordered Dimensions
In practice, many data cubes have unordered dimensions. That is, the order of values in the domain of those dimensions have no apparent semantics associated with it. For example, in Table 1 the dimension employee has no natural ordering. In the core cuboid of a data cube tuples can usually be re-ordered such that their orders in ordered dimensions are not affected. For example, in Table 1 assuming the dimension employee is unordered, tuples can be horizontally re-ordered along employee dimension.
Cardinality-based compromiseability of data cubes depends on the density of each block of the core cuboid. As shown in Section 4, full blocks or dense blocks with cardinalities above the upper bound given in Theorem 2 cannot be non-trivially compromised. Without losing any useful information, the tuples in a core cuboid can be re-ordered such that partitioning the core cuboid leads to more full blocks and dense blocks. One consequence of this re-ordering is that aggregation tier will contain more safe aggregations leading to better usability of the system without sacrificing the desired non-compromiseability.
Techniques already exist in increasing the number of dense blocks in data cubes by re-ordering tuples along un-ordered dimensions. For example, the row shuffling algorithm presented in [4] re-orders tuples in the core cuboid, so that the tuples containing similar values are moved closer to each other. We can implement the row shuffling algorithm as a step prior to the algorithm Ctrl Inf Cube, by applying it to the full core cuboid of data cubes. In [4] the similarity between two tuples is defined as their p-norm distance. To apply the row shuffling algorithm, this similarity definition needs to be revised, such that two tuples are similar if they are both missing, or none of them are. The algorithm yields outputs desired by inference control because tuples in the core cuboid are clustered to form more dense blocks that are noncompromiseable. Consequently more answerable aggregations will be included in ¢ £ . Other clustering techniques may also be used for this purpose as long as they do not lose the information contained in the ordering of tuples.
Capturing External Knowledge
Compromiseability of a data cube depends on the number of missing tuples in the core cuboid, while the latter in turn depends on the external knowledge of users. Thus it is critical to precisely capture the external knowledge of users. The external knowledge that can be expressed using logic rules are relatively easy to capture. For example, in Table 1 , a user knows his/her own salary, and the manager of a user knows the user's salary. On the other hand, it is usually not easy to capture the external knowledge that cannot be expressed using rules. For example, a user who incidentally learned Alice's salary in December poses queries to infer Mary's bonus. He will likely succeed without being detected.
Because capturing all possible external knowledge is practically infeasible, it is important to attenuate the damage caused by undetected external knowledge. This damage can be measured by the average number of sensitive values that are compromised as the consequence of knowing one sensitive value from external knowledge. For example, in Table 12 , assume a user learns Alice's salary in December from external knowledge. The user is able to compromise five other values subsequently, including Mary's salary in December, Mary's Bonus, Alice's Bonus and Alice's salary in October. Intuitively, the more sensitive values the user can compromise with the external knowledge of one sensitive value, the more vulnerable to undetected external knowledge the inference control mechanism is.
By partitioning the data tier and the aggregation tier, the damages caused by undetected external knowledge can be localized and confined. According to the second property of our three-tier inference control model, a tuple is £ ¢ -related to an aggregation vector only when they are in the same sub-data cube. Consequently, learning tuples in one sub-data cube from external knowledge does not help the user to compromise the tuples in the other sub-data cubes. With the external knowledge of one tuple, the average number Sub Total 7000 4300 3000 7000 Table 12 : Consequences of Knowing One Sensitive Value of subsequently compromised tuples is bounded by the average cardinality of each block in the partition of the core cuboid. This number is relatively small compared to the cardinality of the whole core cuboid.
More careful considerations reveals that not only the number of subsequently compromised tuples matter, but also different compromised tuples may have different significance with respect to inference control. For example, in Table 1 , the user may be more interested in knowing Alice's salary in first three quarters than knowing Alice's salary in October, after the user has learned Alice's salary in December. The reason is that the user knows in most cases Alice's salary does not change much between October and December. As stated above, partitioning data tier ensures that subsequently compromised sensitive values are confined to the same block containing the sensitive value known through external knowledge. Therefore the threetier inference control attenuates the damage of undetected external knowledge in both the number and the significance of the subsequently compromised tuples.
Update Operations
Although update operations are less common in OLAP systems than they are in traditional databases, the data in data warehouses need to be modified over time. Typical update operations include inserting or deleting tuples, and modifying the values contained in tuples. Those updates need to be done efficiently to reduce their impact on availability of the system. Three-tier inference control facilitates pre-defined aggregations, which may also need to be updated as underlying data change.
Cardinality-based inference control is independent of the sensitive values. Hence modifying sensitive values usually has no effect on compromiseability and can be ignored by inference control mechanisms. For example, changing the salaries in Table 1 does not affect the compromiseability of the data cube. On the other hand, modifying the non-sensitive values contained in a tuple may affect the compromiseability, because the modified tuple may belong to a different block than the original tuple in the partition of the core cuboid. We treat the modification of non-sensitive values contained in a tuple as two separate operations, deletion of the original tuples and insertion of new tuples containing the modified values. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the algorithms for the deletion and insertion of a tuple respectively. These two update operations are handled similarly, therefore we discuss deletion only. The subroutine Ctrl Inf Delete in Figure 3 updates ¢ £ upon the deletion of a tuple. It first finds the sub-data cube that contains the tuple to be deleted. If the sub-data cube is already compromised before the deletion, then it must re-main so after the deletion. Hence in such a case the subroutine Ctrl Inf Delete returns immediately. If the sub-data cube is not compromised before the deletion, the subroutine Ctrl Inf Sub Delete is called to determine the compromiseability of the sub-data cube after the deletion of the tuple. The subroutine Ctrl Inf Sub Delete reduces a dimension cardinality by one if the corresponding value is contained in the deleted tuple only. The cardinality-based compromiseability criteria are then applied to the sub-data cube similarly as in Ctrl Inf Sub. There is no need to check if the core cuboid is full after deleting a tuple from it. The complexity of the subroutine Ctrl Inf Sub Delete is bound by 
